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# LYSIMACHUS:

OR, A

# DIALOGUE

CONCERNING THE

# UNION

OF

## *Great-Britain* and *Ireland.*

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BRITISH MUSEUM

# *LYSIMACHUS:*

OR, A

# DIALOGUE, &c.

## NICANDER.

HOW cautiouſly hath Art followed Nature, *Lyſimachus*, in adorning this Retirement; not a Spot that is not new in its Appearance; and all, though different, conſent in beautifying the Whole. Thoſe brown and barren Mountains, with what Grandeur they incloſe and recommend theſe Hills, and their greener Valleys. Even yon Crags with their climbing Inhabitants want not their Beauty, but relieve the Eye from a ſated Indulgence on the rich Paſtures and ſleek

Herds that graze the neighbouring Meadows.

LYSIMACHUS.

Yes, *Nicander*; but all theſe Beauties, different though they are, make but one Picture; and although each Part hath ſome peculiar Charm, the Whole wears an unchanged Appearance. There *Nicander*, there my Admiration turns itſelf, to that ſpacious Bay, that Sea which knows no Bound to its Extent, nor is confined one Hour to the ſame Aſpect; grand even with its calmeſt Countenance, but, when diſturbed, ſublimely terrible. Art too hath added to its Variety; not a Sail which Induſtry wafts over its Surface but diverſifies the Proſpect, and calls up different Paſſions to pleaſe or to afflict us. What Delight it is to behold a proſperous Fleet laden with Merchandize, every Veſſel crowding her white Sails, and trying all her Art to catch the moſt favourable Breeze, and win the firſt Welcome from the Merchant. Theſe, after various Toils, ſleep ſecurely within the Arms of

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that great City, and are happy if compared with him whom Storms have driven from his Courſe, who arriveth late at his deſtined Port, yet juſt when he thinks his Dangers paſt, and embraceth his little Offspring in Imagination, ſees a new Tempeſt gathering round him, and after the laſt Efforts to ſave his ſhattered Bark, eſcapes upon a Plank, only to view the Shipwreck of his Fortunes. Such Sights, *Nicander*, though for a while they may afflict, call up the worthieſt Feelings of Humanity, and give this moving Picture ſuch Power, as the lovelieſt Paradiſe with all its Variety of Hill and Valley, Wood and Water cannot boaſt. What Pleaſure can be greater, or indulged more juſtly, than of ſeeing the Riches of the new World, whatever grows on the Banks of the *Ohio*, or employs the cold *Indians* of *Labrador*, the Furs of *Canada*, and the Silk of *Carolina*, wafted by my Garden to employ our Artificers, to be the Summer Ornaments, and Winter Security of our Matrons and their Daughters: To behold the Labours of

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our own Fields and of our Looms, conveyed to Nations, yet ignorant of our Arts; whoſe Wants ſupport our Affluence, and to whoſe Fields and Foreſts our Gardens and Parks are indebted for ſo large a Share of that Beauty which you ſo much admire. This fragrant Saſſafras, the Hickery that ſhades my Avenue, and yon wavy Cedars, Cypreſſes and Pines, that cloath their Hills with perpetual Green, are the tranſplanted Natives of *Virginia*. Every Ship comes freighted with new Beauty to our Fields, and Treaſure to our Artiſts; and I conſider the different Fleets that ſteer along my Garden as introducing new Worlds to my View.

NICANDER.

*Lyſimachus*, theſe Scenes are juſtly pleaſing; and often I have ſeen with Tranſport, all that *Perſia*, *Indus* and *China*, whatever the World produces, born on the *Thames* by Fleets that hold the Empire of the Seas. The Ships are the Strength, the Riches and the Glory of *Britain*; for the Navy

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which fill her Rivers and Harbours, the Sailors who man them, and the Burthens they bear, are her own. But theſe Things call to my Remembrance what I would endeavour to forget; it is far otherwiſe here; the Sails which paſs this Garden are the Property of other Nations, and Proofs of the confined Condition of our Commerce. Every Ship that viſits our Harbour carries home the Price of the Viſit, while we have none that bring an equivalent to ballance the Loſs. By theſe Means, our Commodities which ſhould ſwell the Riches of our own, increaſe the Wealth of other Nations; nor is this the only Loſs, for our naval Strength is neceſſarily little, becauſe our Shipping are few; the Glory of our Kingdom is alſo little, and the Deſire of Glory in no wiſe greater. Hence it is, that I behold with Regret, the Commerce of this Kingdom carried on by other States, and the Means of peopling a fruitful Iſland, and ſtrengthening the Hands of its Monarch, reſtrained by the Laws of Navigation made in the neighbouring Kingdom: And I often

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wiſh to ſee the two States more completely united, the Ports of the known World open to both, the ſame Rewards and the ſame Glory propoſed, and a general Competition among his Majeſty's Subjects for the Strength, Riches, and Honour of his Dominions. We ſhould not then behold one Kingdom making partial Laws to the Diſadvantage of another, nor Jealouſies and Fears diſturbing the Minds of the Multitude, and diſtracting the ſeparate Councils of the States. The Veſſel would be navigated by the ſame Hands, and not by contending Crews; the public Weal would be the public Concern; and the ſame Men would no longer act different Parts by voting one Way in the Parliament of *Great Britain* to favour the Miniſter, and another Way in the Parliament of *Ireland*, to ſupport an Influence in their native Country. The Reſtleſſneſs of thoſe Peers, who, not contented with a Share in the Councils of this Kingdom, covet an inferior Honour in *Britain*, would receive a deſerved Check, ſince only a limited Number would be admitted into

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the general Council, and conſequently others would ſeek that Authority at Home, which alone could recommend them to a Seat among the *Britiſh* Peerage. A ſeptennial Rotation would whet the Emulation of the Peers and Commoners to merit the Re-election of their Countrymen, and *Ireland* no longer would be compelled to ſubmit to that ſevereſt Teſt of her Slavery, the Acceptance of Laws in the framing of which ſhe never had a Part. Our Paſtures would be Objects of Pleaſure and Emolument, and our Wool, which at preſent cloaths the Armies of *France*, intitle us to the Order of the Golden Fleece, that honourable Enſign of Induſtry, which ſo long adorned the Merchants of the *Netherlands*. No Diviſions would ſubſiſt, but like the Scene around us, the Parts, how diſtinct and diſtant ſoever, would compoſe an intire Piece, and the whole wear one unchanged Appearance.

All were ſurprized, and many were pleaſed with the happy Effects of an

Union ſo clearly enumerated by *Nicander*; even thoſe who heard him with leaſt Delight, were unprepared to plead againſt one who ſeemed to come armed, with all that could be urged to recommend it. Yet *Lyſimachus* thus ſhortly anſwered; Judge not haſtily, *Nicander*, for Matters of ſuch Import require our beſt Conſideration. What if we ſhould adjourn a Subject too important for the Converſation of the Table that now expects us, and reſerve it for the Feſtival of our young Prince's Nativity which you have all promiſed to celebrate at this Lodge; for what Subject can ſo worthily employ us on the Birth-Day of our Prince, as one which ſo nearly concerns the Strength and Welfare of his Dominions and the Dignity of his Crown? *Nicander* readily aſſented, and *Critias* who was fondly partial to his native Iſland, modeſtly deſired that *Lyſimachus* would undertake to anſwer what *Nicander* had urged ſo ſtrongly, as to make a ſerious Impreſſion on all who heard him. *Lyſimachus* would have declined a Taſk, which he repreſented as

the general Concern, but being induced by the Intreaties of young *Theramenes*, who was then forming himſelf for the public Service, he conſented to ſubmit his Opinion as well concerning the Advantages as the Evils which might follow ſuch an Union of the Kingdoms as *Nicander* had ardently deſired. The Feſtival came, and at Twelve, when the Sun made the Shade moſt inviting, they retired into an Arbour overhanging the Bay, which was open to the cool Breezes of the Sea, and being ſeated there, *Lyſimachus*, at whoſe Feet ſat young *Theramenes*, thus began the Converſation.

A ſtricter Union of *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, is a Subject which during theſe latter Years, hath engaged the Attention of many thinking well-minded Men beſides you, *Nicander*, and more particularly thoſe who have turned their Thoughts to the preſent Commerce of *Britain*, and the neighbouring Nations, which have been ſo induſtrious and ſucceſsful as to rival her antient and valua-

ble Manufactures. What they have ſaid on this Occaſion deſerves our Regard; but ſome have touched lightly on the Advantages of that indefinite Word, an Union; others have been more copious without ſuggeſting any probable or plauſible Terms thereof, and all have confined themſelves principally to the Benefits which thereby would accrue to *Great-Britain*. I do not know that it hath yet been conſidered in that extenſive Senſe in which *Nicander* hath repreſented it, and in which it deſerves to be viewed by all who think it an Object worthy of their Attention. Often I have endeavoured to collect the Conſequences of uniting the great national Councils, have often turned my Thoughts from Object to Object, and formed Opinions which another Day's Examination entirely removed; and to confeſs a Truth, after frequent Reflections, I am unwilling to deduce any Concluſion. A true State of Facts is not eaſily had, and without it all Reaſoning is little better than the Deluſions of Fancy. The Arguments which occurred to

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me ſince our laſt Converſation, are far from being ſatisfactory, and, at the beſt, only lead to a more perfect State of the Caſe; yet I will ſubmit them with Pleaſure, deſiring to be informed, as often as you find me wrong, and leaving to you to draw the Concluſions, if any can be deduced from theſe Facts.

When great Changes become the ſubjects of Debate, and great civil Changes are always preceded by Diverſity of Opinions, it is natural to look into the Reaſoning which attended Facts of a ſimilar Nature, and the Subject of *Nicander*'s Wiſhes, immediately led me to an Event, which lives in the Memory of many, and thoſe not very aged Perſons, the Union of *England* and *Scotland*. It is not intended to enter into the Ambition or Avarice, the Steadineſs or Levity, the Virtues, Vices, or Foibles of thoſe who effected the Union of thoſe Kingdoms. A Variety of Characters appear on ſuch great Occaſions, and a Variety of Arts are practiſed, accordingly, as the Deſigns of the Agents are general or partial. To

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lay open theſe is the Buſineſs of Hiſtory; nothing more is intended here than to place in a ſimple View the Arguments on one Side inviting, and on the other, diſſwading an Union, as they appeared at that Time, to the Eſpouſers and to the Oppoſers.

The Reaſoning in Favour of that Union was founded on ſuch Arguments as theſe.

*Firſt*, In many Points the Kingdoms were united; the Relations of Sovereign and of Subject were in both the ſame.

*Secondly*, The Language, though not the ſame, was ſimilar, and a Coalition ſeemed more likely to produce a Refinement, by incorporating into one Language the moſt expreſſive and agreeable Words of both, than to debaſe the Language of either.

*Thirdly*, Their Religion was the ſame, for notwithſtanding a Difference in the Forms of Worſhip, as alſo in the Church-

Church-Government and Order, the great Lines and Principles of Religion were ſo much alike, that no Danger could be apprehended from a few formal external Diſſentions.

*Fourthly*, The two Nations were Inhabitants of the ſame Iſland, and therefore intended by Nature for the Protection of each other, which could never be ſo well effected as by an Union of the national Councils.

*Fifthly*, *Scotland*, by enjoying a free Commerce with *England* and her Plantations, and the Protection of an *Engliſh* Fleet, would be ſecurely enriched, and the Intermixture occaſioned by Commerce and Marriage, would add to the Harmony and Strength of the whole Iſland.

*Sixthly*, The ambitious Hopes of ſome *Scottiſh* Families, which diſturbed the Tranquility of the Kingdom, would be fruſtrated.

*Seventhly*,

*Seventhly*, The whole Iſland would find a general Security in the Houſe of Commons againſt partial Adminiſtration of Juſtice, and the violent Meaſures of Miniſters, which had been ſo often and ſo juſtly, but in vain complained of in *Scotland*.

*Eighthly*, The Seeds of Faction and civil Diſſention were ſown in the *Scotiſh* Ariſtocracy, and grew to Strength in the Vaſſalage; and the reſtleſs Ambition of the Lords rendered the Adminiſtration of the Kingdom, and all its Leagues with *England* unſtable.

Such were the Arguments employed by the Friends and Advocates for the Union, both in and out of Parliament in both Kingdoms. The Oppoſers of it took their Arguments deeper; they went to the Root of their own Power, and had Honeſty enough to ſet Lines to their Privileges; they argued,

*Firſt*, That there are certain Fundamentals of every juſt Conſtitution, unalterable,

alterable, but by the Voice of the People, from whom all juſt Government is derived, and for whoſe Benefit conſtituted.

*Secondly*, That although the Parliament in the Exerciſe of its ſeveral Powers was regulated by a Majority of its Voices, yet the national Right of having Parliaments, was a Fundamental not to be abrogated by the unanimous Voice of the Parliament itſelf, but dependent on the Conſent of thoſe whoſe Privilege it was to be repreſented.

*Thirdly*, That if the Parliament of *Scotland* could alter the Fundamentals of the Conſtitution, ſo alſo could the Parliament of *England*; and what Security could be had, that a *Britiſh* Parliament compounded of the *Engliſh* and *Scotch* might not do the ſame?

*Fourthly*, That an Union of the General Councils was a Deſtruction of the Independent Monarchy of *Scotland*; and that the Dignity of the Peerage, to

whom Votes in Parliament were Rights of Inheritance, would be diminiſhed, unleſs by the Union all its Peers ſhould be, as the Lords of *England* are, Voters in the Upper Houſe of National Council and Judicature.

*Fifthly*, That a Deſtruction of the *Scottiſh* Parliament, was a Deprivation of all Security as to the Rights that might be ſtipulated for by the Treaty: For, the Independent Conſtitution of *Scotland* being deſtroyed; Redreſs was to be had only in a *Britiſh* Parliament, where the *Scottiſh* Members never could prevail, how juſt ſoever their Arguments, when the Queſtion was between *Engliſh* and *Scotch* Men.

*Sixthly*, That Attendance on a *Britiſh* Parliament would be a great Expence to the remote Repreſentatives of *Scotland*, and therefore a Source of as great Corruption.

*Seventhly*, That a ſmall Number of *Scottiſh* Peers, as the Prelate of *Bath* remarked,

remarked, would only increaſe the dead Weight of the Prelates.

Theſe were the Arguments of the Opponents of an Union, the ſtrongeſt of which, although over-ruled even in *Scotland* at the Time of the Union, nevertheleſs after a few Years, were in the Mouths of ſome who had over-ruled them. And whatever Juſtice may be in thoſe which concern the Right and Privilege of a Parliament, common Prudence ſeems to recommend thoſe which touched upon *Scottiſh* Security.

In the Year 1706-7, an Union was concluded, and the Articles thereof are ſo well known, that a Recital to you is neither neceſſary nor pertinent; an Union very favourable to the Commerce of *Scotland*, which being a naked Country, barren of Products for Manufactures and Trade, was now at Liberty to import from all Quarters of the World the rude Materials, and ſtamp the Value of its Labour and Genius upon them.

In the Year 1708-9, a Law was made by a *Britiſh* Parliament which changed the Proceedings of the *Scottiſh* Courts concerning Matters of high Treaſon; and in the Debates upon that Law it was maintained, that the only fundamental and unalterable Parts of the Union, were thoſe which concerned Religion and the Proportion of public Taxes.

In the Year 1712, the *Scottiſh* Members were almoſt unanimous in an Inquiry which of the Articles of the Union were fundamental and unalterable, and which not: A ſtrange Appearance, if we conſider, that very few Years had paſſed ſince a Majority of the *Scottiſh* Parliament had undertaken, without the Leave of the People, to change what was deemed by ſome, and if any Thing be ſo, muſt ever be deemed moſt fundamental and unalterable, the very Conſtitution of their Kingdom.

In the Year 1713, before the War was concluded, during which the Union com-

commenced, a Law was made by which a Duty on Malt was impoſed on *Scotland*, as well as *England*, expreſly contrary to the fourteenth Article of the Union, which provides, *That any Malt to be made and conſumed in that Part of the united Kingdom called* Scotland, *ſhall not be charged with any Impoſition on Malt during the preſent War.* Hence it appears that the Articles concerning publick Taxes were to a *Britiſh* Parliament no more fundamental and unalterable than any others.

Here *Theramenes* interpoſed; if truly I recollect, *Lyſimachus*, at the time when this Law was enacted, the Preliminaries of a Peace were debated by the Ambaſſadors of the contending Powers. But pardon my Interpoſition, for I mean not to interrupt your Application of the *Scotiſh* Arguments, to the more intimate Connection propoſed by *Nicander*, between *Great Britain* and *Ireland*.

LYSIMACHUS.

Truth will not want an Advocate, *Theramenes*, when you are preſent; I remember well the Period, nor did I ſeek by ſtrict and captious Arguments to throw a Shade on the *Britiſh* Conduct; but the Law was made before the War was concluded; and, if the propoſed Preliminaries had been rejected, and the War had ſubſiſted in its fulleſt Vigour, the Tax would have ſubſiſted alſo. It was impoſed in Contradiction to the Letter of the Union, and the ſmalleſt Deviations from fundamental Articles lead to a Latitude which admits of no Reſtraint. It would be not unpleaſing now to examine which of the Arguments beforementioned are concluſive for and againſt an Union of the Parliaments of theſe Iſlands; but ſuch Inquiry ſeems with no leſs Propriety to follow a ſhort View of the preſent State of *Ireland*, particularly of its Legiſlature and Commerce.

*Ire-*

*Ireland*, a ſeparate Iſland, under a mixed Monarchy, hath the ſame Head or King with *Britain*, but ſeparate Parliaments.

The Peerage of *Ireland* is hereditary as in *England*, and originally was intitled to the like Powers: But *Britain* hath gained from the *Iriſh* Peerage their judiciary Power, by Management. *Iriſh* Suitors appeal to the *Britiſh* Nobles, who by their own Vote or Opinion, which they have lately paſſed into a Law, and by the Cuſtom of a few Years, are the ultimate Judges of all Controverſies concerning Property in *Ireland*. This hath added to the Dependence of *Ireland*, and to the Wealth of *England*.

The Commons of *Ireland* are Elective as in *Britain*, but Elections are not ſo frequent; the Duration of the Parliaments being arbitrary in the King, and not fixed by any Laws. The Power of the Commons is the ſame as in *Britain*.

Whether

Whether Conqueſt or willing Submiſſion of the Inhabitants firſt gave the Kings of *England* the Sovereignty of *Ireland*, hath been much debated; it ſeems that they cannot derive it from a better Original than the latter. But, if the firſt Submiſſion was the Conſequence of Conqueſt, and not founded on a Treaty of Union, yet without doubt, the *Engliſh* Colony, which ſettled here, and in the Courſe of Time, overſpread the Kingdom, were voluntary Subjects, and in no Way obnoxious to the Treatment which Conquerors claim a Right of giving the Conquered. It is certain, that during many Ages this Iſland was governed ſolely by its own Laws, and adopted thoſe of *England* when they ſeemed convenient, as *Rome* and other States, adopted the Laws of *Greece* and the neighbour Countries.

During the Reign of his Majeſty's Predeceſſor, under the Pretext of better ſecuring the Dependence of *Ireland*, (which Nature had ſecured) *Britain* by her

her own ſeparate Act, impowered herſelf to bind *Ireland* by Laws made without the Advice, Conſent, or Knowledge of the *Iriſh* Parliament. With what Juſtice, or how *Ireland* had provoked *Great-Britain* to make a Law; which, if inforced in its utmoſt Extent, would render inſignificant all *Iriſh* Parliaments, it is of no Conſequence here to inquire; a Search for Right between a weak and a powerful State, being generally found a fruitleſs Imployment. Had Circumſtances been reverſed, perhaps *Ireland* would have acted a ſimilar Part. Notwithſtanding that Law, this Iſland hath hitherto injoyed her own Legiſlative, and is principally governed by her own Laws.

The King's Privy Council here exerciſeth a Power very injurious to the Liberty of the Parliament; it receiveth all Bills or Petitions, which are framed by the Lords or the Commons, and ſometimes deſtroys them before they are tranſmitted to the *Engliſh* Court; at other Times totally changes them, and

ſends to *England* Petitions very different from thoſe which are approved by the Parliament. By theſe Means, it may happen, that the King may be a Stranger to the Deſires of his People; or what is equally dangerous, the King in the Perſon of his Viceroy, may ſit down with his own Privy Council to frame the Heads of Laws. Such Power veſted in the Privy Council of *Britain* would be deemed an Eſtabliſhment of Arbitrary Power, and ſuch Power *Britons* will not give till they are ripe for a Change unfavourable to Liberty.

Excepting the Points now mentioned, the Conſtitutions of *Britain* and *Ireland* are the ſame; but theſe Points make a remarkable Difference between the Liberty of the two Nations. The Prince, who by the *Britiſh* Conſtitution hath no Share in the Legiſlature, but the Power of refuſing or ratifying, hath by the *Iriſh* Conſtitution, the Power of propoſing and debating; and thereby

Liberty,

Liberty, though not loſt, at the leaſt is indangered. One Reaſon ſeems to demonſtrate this. The Prince alone hath the executive Power; if he hath a Power alſo to propoſe Laws, ſuch Propoſals go to the two Houſes of Parliament, loaded with all the Weight of Royal Regard and Affection; all the Prince's Servants in the Exerciſe of the executive Power, will feel a Partiality to them; the Freedom and Candour of Debate is thereby reſtrained; and, if the Prince hath a Majority of his Servants or Placemen in the Legiſlature; the State owes much to his Virtue or his Ignorance, if its Liberties receive no Injury.

From theſe Particulars, it ſeems, that the Fundamental Conſtitutional Laws of *Ireland* are not ſo favourable to Liberty as thoſe of *Britain*, howſoever the Civil or Municipal may be. But as *Britain* hath more Liberty by her Laws than ſhe enjoyeth; *Ireland* enjoyeth more than ſhe hath by them.

Let us turn now to the Commerce of this Kingdom. No Iſland is more fitted for Trade, whether you conſider the Situation of the Iſland, the Fertility of the Soil, or the Commodiouſneſs of its Bays and Havens. Yet with all theſe Advantages, I confeſs, *Nicander*, that its Trade is comparatively inſignificant. Commerce, which hath different Foundations in different Governments, naturally hates all Reſtrictions; *it traverſes the Earth*, ſays a learned Writer, *flies from the Place where it is oppreſſed, and ſtays where it has Liberty to breath.* It is therefore found moſt extenſive in Republics, and Governments nearly Republican.

It is ſupported by foreign or domeſtic Products; by foreign in thoſe States, which bring from one Nation what is neceſſary or deſired by another, buying cheap and ſelling dear. Such is the Trade of *Holland*, whoſe Merchants are Carriers,

Carriers, and whoſe Gain is little, but conſtant.

By domeſtic Products; or by both, as in *England*, and many other Nations.

*Ireland* enjoys no Trade of the former Kind, for that is a Traffic founded on Oeconomy which flouriſhes moſt where Liberty is greateſt. A ſteril Country, and an equal Government, determine Men to that Species of Commerce of ſupplying the Wants of one foreign Nation with the Commodities of another: Great Spirit, which is the Conſequence of great Freedom, extends it; and therefore it cannot flouriſh in a Country ſtraitened by the commercial Laws of another trading State. High Cuſtoms on Exportation and Importation are alſo great Bars to this Species of Traffick; but this Species greatly promotes Navigation, and Navigation increaſes the Number of Sailors and the Strength of an Iſland; therefore high Cuſtoms are not apparently conducive to the well-being of the Community.

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The Trade of *Ireland* ariſeth from its domeſtic Products. The native Products of *Ireland* are Corn, Cattle, Wool, Flax, Fiſh, Lead, Iron, Copper, and from theſe its chief Commodities for Export are derived. A very modern Writer in enumerating its Exports hath introduced Honey, Hemp, and Pipe-Staves, and omitted Linen Cloth; and his Account might have been true a Century ago; but, it is univerſally known that the only Manufacture which is now carried to any great Degree of Perfection is that of Flax, and that all the Hemp Seed produced in the Iſland would not feed the Gold-finches in the Cages.

The three great Commodities are its Cattle, its Flax, and its Wool. Beef, Butter, Hydes, and Tallow, ſupport the Traffic of the *Southern*, and Linen-Cloth that of the *Northern* Counties. If no Reſtraints were laid on the Woollen Manufacture, the Trade of *Ireland*, in that ſingle Commodity, would always create a Ballance in its Favour.

Favour. But *England*, neglectful of the general Weal, reſtrained this Traffic, and by Means of this partial Regard, and the additional Aid of ſtolen Wool from *Ireland* as well as *Great-Britain*, *France* hath rivalled *England* in her favourite Manufacture, and acquired a Trade, which *Ireland* only is able to take from her. *Decker*, ſpeaking of the ſame Subject, argues thus, " Suppoſe one Pack of *Iriſh* Wool of " ſix Pounds Value to make four Cloths; " that Pack of Wool, being ſmuggled " to *France*, works up two Packs of " *French* Wool (which is too coarſe to " be manufactured alone) making all " together twelve Cloths.

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| " A Pack of *Iriſh* Wool " ſmuggled to *France* hin- " ders the Sale of twelve " *Engliſh* Cloths, ſuppoſing " them of ſix Pounds Va- " lue each, and prevents " the Circulation of | l. | s. | d. |
| | 72 | 0 | 0 |

" A Pack of Wool ma- " nufactured in *Ireland* can

" hinder

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| " hinder the Sale only of | | | |
| " four Cloths at ſix Pounds | | | |
| " each, and can prevent | | | |
| " the Circulation but of | 24 | 0 | 0 |
| The Difference is | 48 | 0 | 0 |
| " It is computed that | | | |
| " one Third of what *Ire-* | | | |
| " *land* gets, centers at laſt | | | |
| " in *England*, which on | | | |
| " the four Cloths at ſix | | | |
| " Pounds each, making | | | |
| " twenty-four Pounds, is | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| " Conſequently the Be- | | | |
| " nefit that *England* re- | | | |
| " ceives by every Pack of | | | |
| " Wool manufactured in | | | |
| " *Ireland*, inſtead of being | | | |
| " ſmuggled into *France*, is | 56 | 0 | 0 |

The only Branch of the Woollen Manufacture, of which *Ireland* enjoys a licit Export, is her Woollen Yarn; ſhe hath enjoyed that Privilege but a few Years, and is allowed to export it only to *England*.

The

The great Support of *Ireland* ariſes therefore from Cattle and Flax. By a Law lately made, *Great-Britain* hath again permitted the Importation of living Cattle from this Iſland, and our Legiſlature ſhould be ſingularly cautious, that, while our breeding Farms are extended, our fattening Grounds are not neglected, for on theſe depends our Commerce in Beef, Tallow and Hydes, and all the profitable Buſineſs of our Dairy, to which we ſo long were Strangers. In the fourth Year of Queen *Anne*, *Ireland* was firſt permitted to export her Linens to the *Britiſh* Plantations. In Exchange for theſe, ſhe may Import, without Delay, Corn and Spirituous Liquors; but by a *Britiſh* Law made in the fourth Year of the preſent King, many principal Materials for Inland Manufactures, ſuch as Dyes, Sugar, Tobacco, and all Materials for Shipping and Navigation which are produced by the Plantations, muſt be landed firſt in *England*, and this is ſuch a Load as Trade can never riſe under. To this it is owing, among other Diſcouragements, That ſuch as the

Commerce of this Kingdom is, it is generally carried on by the means of Foreign Bottoms, except in Caſes where they are particularly prohibited; and thereby the Advantage of Freight or Carriage is loſt, which *Nicander* ſo juſtly laments.

Two great, I was about to ſay, the greateſt Drains from *Ireland*, are Bread and Fuel. It has Coal-Mines, but does not work them; it has fruitful Land, but does not till it.

The Lands fitteſt for Corn are diſtant from the Capital and the great Sea-Ports; and *Ireland* having little Water-Carriage, hath therefore little Tillage. *England* and her Plantations ſupply it largely with Bread, and the former alone with Fuel. By a late prudent Law which gives a Præmium for the Inland Carriage of Corn to the Capital, and by the Pains daily taken to cut navigable Canals through the Iſland, both theſe Inconveniences will be found to decreaſe, and Time may effectually remove them.

Of

Of all that the Commerce or the Lands of *Ireland* produce, *Decker* ſays, ‘ *That one Third is ſent to England for* ‘ *Goods, or ſpent by Abſentees.*’ *Gee* ſays, ‘ *That it is thought near one Third* ‘ *Part of the Rents of the whole Iſland* ‘ *belong to Engliſh Noblemen and Gen-* ‘ *tlemen reſident in England.*’ This is not the preſent Caſe; but heavy Drains there are; Places and Penſions of Two, Three and Four Thouſand Pounds annually from the *Iriſh* Revenues, to the Natives and Inhabitants of *Britain* and more remote Countries; Remittances to Abſentees; *Britiſh* Schools; *Britiſh* Judicature, and the *Britiſh* Court, where ſome reſort for Education, ſome for Juſtice that might be had at Home, and where others go in Queſt of Preferments. By theſe Means more than one Third of all which the Induſtry and reſtrained Commerce of *Ireland* produceth, centers at laſt in *Great-Britain.*

The Revenues or Taxes of *Ireland* introduce themſelves into a View of its

Trade. Taxes are the Portion of private Property paid for ſecuring the Remainder; and the ſeveral Degrees of Liberty are the Equivalents for which the various Loads of Taxes in different Countries are paid.

No Country enjoys a higher Degree of Liberty than *Britain*; the Conſtitution and the Subject are no where more free; and no Kingdom pays higher Taxes. Indeed the Taxes of *Great-Britain* are not only heavy, but what is worſe, they are unequal, particularly the Land-Tax; and Diſproportion is a ſufficient Cauſe of Diſcontent. Some Men pay too much, and their Ruin is a public Loſs; others pay too little, and their Exemption is a public Vexation: the Cauſe of the Diſproportion in this Tax adds alſo to the Diſcontent.

That *Ireland* enjoys little Liberty comparatively with *England*, appears from the Laws which make its Conſtitution; it enjoys but little Trade, for there too it is cramped by *Great-Britain*;

it

it is not admitted to receive the Reward of manufacturing its native Commodities, and being denied the Benefits conſequent of Induſtry, it is not ſo induſtrious as *Britain*; for where Labour produceth the Reward, there only the Reward will produce Labour: but *Ireland* alſo pays ſmall Taxes comparatively; To ſay that *Ireland* is therefore happier even in this Reſpect than *England*, would be too haſty a Concluſion. The Baron MONTESQUIEU, who writes profeſſedly to make Men think, ſays, " There have been Inſtances in parti-
" cular Monarchies of ſmall States ex-
" empt from Taxes, which have been
" as miſerable as the circumjacent Places
" that groaned under the Weight of
" Exactions. The chief Reaſon of this
" is, that the ſmall State can hardly
" have any ſuch Thing as Induſtry,
" Arts, or Manufactures; becauſe in this
" Reſpect it lies under a thouſand Re-
" ſtraints from the great State. The
" great State is bleſſed with Induſtry,
" Manufactures and Arts, and eſtabliſhes
" Laws by which theſe very Advantages

" are

" are procured. The petty State there-
" fore becomes neceſſarily poor, let it
" pay ever ſo few Taxes. And yet
" ſome have concluded from the Pover-
" ty of thoſe petty States; that in or-
" der to render the People induſtrious
" it is neceſſary to load them with
" Taxes; but it would be a much better
" Concluſion to ſay that they ought to
" have no Taxes at all."

At the firſt View he might ſeem to ſpeak of *Ireland*; nor at the ſecond is his Obſervation inapplicable; although *Ireland* is not totally exempted from Taxes. Its Revenues are hereditary, additional and appropriated. The hereditary conſiſt of,

1. The Crown and Quit-Rents.
2. The Compoſition-Rents.
3. Caſual Revenue from Forfeitures, Fines, &c.
4. Prizage on Wines.
5. Light-houſe Duties.
6. Tunnage and Poundage.
7. Hearth-Money.

8. Ex-

8. Exciſe.
9. Ale-Licences.
10. Wine-Licences.

Theſe amount to more than five hundred thouſand Pounds annually.

The additional Revenues are impoſed every alternate Year, to make good the Deficiencies of the hereditary in ſupporting the Eſtabliſhment, and theſe with the Poundage thereon and other Duties and Aids, amount generally to two hundred thouſand Pounds *per Annum*.

The appropriated Duties are ſuch as are veſted in the Crown for the Purpoſes of improving and extending particular Arts and Manufactures, the Linen-Trade, and the Tillage of the Kingdom; for encouraging the Proteſtant Religion and extending Navigation thro' the Iſland: And all theſe Taxes are paid for the particular Support of this Iſland.

We

We will return now, *Theramenes*, and endeavour to find which of the Arguments uſed in favour of the *Scotiſh* Union will conclude for an Union of theſe Iſlands of *Britain* and *Ireland*.

We enjoy, *Theramenes*, the ſame Sovereign, and we uſe the ſame Language. The ſame Mode of Religion is eſtabliſhed by Law; but here a Difference ariſeth; the Number of Papiſts exceeds that of Proteſtants in *Ireland*. Many Laws are already made to prevent the Growth of Popery, and others may be needful hereafter; the Perſons fit to propoſe and inforce ſuch Laws are thoſe who accurately know the Circumſtances and Occaſions requiring them; and theſe can be minutely known only to the People reſiding in the Kingdom. But if the two Parliaments are incorporated, the Members from *Ireland* cannot reſide in their Country. Or, admitting that the Laws already made concerning that Article are ſufficient, is it of any Conſequence or none, that

the

the Legiſlators are diſperſed throughout the Kingdom to overſee the Execution of the Laws? If it be of any, that Advantage will be loſt, by ſending the *Iriſh* Parliament to a ſeparate Iſland; and ſuch as this Reaſoning is, it may be extended to all Laws with equal Juſtice as to thoſe concerning Popery.

From the Argument, that Nature, by placing *England* and *Scotland* on the ſame Continent, and ſurrounding them with the ſame Barrier, pointed out an Union of their Councils, what can be inferred, but that Nature, by diſuniting theſe Iſlands and placing a Sea between them, pointed out the Neceſſity of ſeparate Councils for their diſtinct internal Governments.

That the Commerce of this Iſland would increaſe, as that of *Scotland* hath, will not be denied, and it is a favourable Argument for a commercial Union. *Scotland* was torn by the Broils of its Barons; but we have here no ambitious Families, as that Kingdom had, to diſturb

Peace of this Iſland; and the Seeds of Dependence on *England* are laid in our Conſtitution, our Situation, and even in our Deſires.

*Scotland* ſought by the Union a Security in the Houſe of Commons againſt the partial Adminiſtration of Juſtice and the oppreſſive Meaſures of its Miniſters, and Officers of the executive Power. But would *Scotland* or *England* have the ſame Security againſt Corruption of Law or the Mal-adminiſtration of public Affairs, if their Parliament reſided in a ſeparate Iſland?

View the Arguments urged againſt an Union of *Scotland* and *England*, and ſee which of theſe may be pleaded againſt an incorporating Union of *Ireland*.

Such as reſpect the Right of a Parliament, to change the whole Conſtitution without the Conſent of the Conſtituents, have their full Weight in this Caſe, and are equally concluſive againſt the Peerage and the Commonalty.

If

If a Nation chuſeth to be governed by a Prince, Nobility and Commons, and gives the Prince the Power of nominating his Nobles, reſerving to the People the Election of the Commons; neither the Peers, when nominated, nor the Commons when elected, are inveſted with the Power of commanding the People to be governed by other Law-givers and in other Manner than they preſcribed.

If the Parliament of *Ireland* can remove the Seat and change the Mode of Government; *Great-Britain* can make new Changes, and who may ſay what Part, or how long *Ireland* ſhall hold any Part in the Legiſlation? Or what Security is there that the Conditions of the Treaty will be fulfilled, ſince all Queſtions concerning the Obſervation of them muſt be diſcuſſed in a *Britiſh* Houſe of Legiſlature, where the Repreſentatives of *Ireland* will be ſo inſignicant in Number? The Monarchy of *Ireland* will ceaſe, and the Dignity of the Peerage be diminiſhed. At-

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tendance on a *Britiſh* Parliament will be a heavy Drain from *Ireland*, if we may judge from the Remittances now made to Abſentees and Solicitors at the Court of *England*; and how eaſy would it be for a *Britiſh* Miniſter, by the Aid of *Iriſh* Places and Penſions, to add to the Number of his Followers the few Commons and Peers which *Ireland* would be permitted to ſend, thereby throwing Weight into the Hands of the Crown, and making the legiſlative dependent on the executive Power?

With ſuch Arguments, recommended by all the Warmth of Patriot Zeal, did the Advocates for the ſeparate Legiſlature of *Scotland* plead againſt the Union. And who, my *Critias*, while Honour and the Love of our Country are dear to Mankind, will not reverence the Memory of *Belhaven* and that *Fletcher* of *Salton*, who acknowledged no Attachment to Kings or Legiſlators, but ſuch as were the Guardians of their Country's Conſtitution?

But

But let us leave theſe Arguments drawn from an Example in ſome Points not correſpondent to the Caſe before us, and therefore not always concluſive. We have ſeen that the Conſtitution of *Ireland* will admit of greater Freedom; That its Parliament wants many Powers eſſential to a truly mixed Monarchy; and how hardly ſoever we may think of its Reſtraints, we are now inquiring only, whether an Incorporation would increaſe or abridge it's Liberties? At the preſent, with all its Imperfections, *Ireland* is yet a Kingdom, and knows its own Parliament. The People have where to lay their Complaints, and many Means of Redreſs, though not attended to; And the Repreſentatives have Honour and the Applauſes of a grateful People to incite them to generous Conduct. The Internal Buſineſs of this Kingdom requires Time and much Deliberation, for it is a growing Kingdom; many Things demand a long Scrutiny and the Examination of the Inhabitants of different Parts. Theſe are attainable while *Ireland* hath its

own

own Parliament and ſendeth its Members inſtructed in its Grievances and Wants; there is a Dignity even in the Name of a Parliament which is grateful to a Nation. Place on one Side three hundred Commoners, the wealthieſt, and, if you will allow ſo much, the moſt deſerving of the People, with an indefinite Number of Lords, aſſembled every alternate Year to tranſact the Buſineſs of this Nation alone; poſſeſſed of the higheſt Honour a Kingdom can beſtow, that of making its Laws; of Power to call Offenders to account for their Actions; of Emulation to deſerve the Praiſes of their Country, and of an Intereſt which ties them to it; Subject to no controul of other Parliaments; the Guardians of the Wealth and Dignity of this Iſland. On another Side place this ſame Kingdom deprived of its ancient Legiſlature, ſending to *Great-Britain* fifty Deputies of the Commons to mix among five hundred and fifty eight Commoners of that Iſland, and twenty Peers to aſſemble with its Nobles; intruſting to theſe all the Internal Buſineſs of the Nation;

Nation; wanting many Laws and Amendments of Laws, yet from the multiplicity of Buſineſs in *Great-Britain* unable to obtain them, or, if Doubts and Difficulties ariſe, to ſupport its Bills by the Teſtimony of its Inhabitants; incapable of any Sway from the Number of its Deputies; without any Internal Awe over the Executive Power; laſtly, diſunited from *Britain* by the Sea, and therefore everlaſtingly of leſs intimate Connection, than attends an Union of Continent. View theſe Appearances, which are not exaggerated; then tell me, *Nicander*, will an Union aid the Conſtitution of the Kingdom? You ſay, one Kingdom will no longer make partial Laws to the Prejudice of the other; but Laws, *Nicander*, which only extend the Privileges of one, without impoſing Reſtraint or Compulſion on another, are not to be cenſured as ſevere Laws. Every Kingdom looks to its Welfare, and we ſhall condemn ourſelves, if we cenſure others for ſeeking 'that Liberty which we ſo ardently deſire. That *Ireland* will no longer be ſubjected to Laws, to

which

which ſhe never aſſented, hath a captivating Sound; and it is true that all Laws will then imply the Aſſent of *Ireland*; but how can it be called more Free, when the Diſſent of all its Members will be of no Avail?

Now, *Nicander*, we will turn with you to the Commercial Advantages attainable by an Union. A principal Argument uſed by many of the Writers in favour of uniting *Ireland*, is the Recovery of the woollen Manufacture which *France* hath Stolen from *England*; and all the Writers are copious on the Advantages which will accrue to *Great-Britain*. *England would be profited*, ſays Decker, *by opening the Trade of Ireland, which Country being too Poor to give it the Extent it is capable of, it muſt therefore be carried on for Years to come by Engliſh Stocks, conſequently a great Part of the Profits of it muſt fall into the Hands of the Engliſh Merchants.* But this Iſland alſo would be advantaged, the Commerce of *France* would be diſtreſſed; and that of this Kingdom increaſed;

greater

greater Wealth would admit greater Taxes, and greater Taxes would lighten the Burthen of *Great-Britain*. That ſuch Advantages would follow an Extent of Trade, is not a Matter of Diſpute; but whether they ſhould be purchaſed at the Expence of a loſt Conſtitution may admit of Argumentation. For a while we will ſuppoſe that the preſent Policy is, by incorporating the Parliament of *Ireland*, to increaſe the Wealth of the Kingdom, though its Freedom ſhould be diminiſhed; and we will endeavour to follow Trade, with all its Conſequences to ſuch a Nation, beyond the firſt ſeducing Appearances.

In the firſt Stage of Trade it creates Independence among Individuals; in its moderate Degree it animates, and rouſeth a Spirit which uſually ſeeks that Freedom moſt ardently which is moſt prohibited. Such a Spirit being inconſiſtent with a dependent ſlaviſh Conſtitution, ſhould be rendered ineffectual, leſt it ſhould ſhake the Conſtitution; for the Means of exerting this Spirit, which

Riches ſupply, can not be taken away without taking away Trade alſo, which ſupplies the Individuals with Money. It may be rendered ineffectual by previous Laws to diſcourage the uſe of Arms and of manly Exerciſes; but thereby Effeminacy and Luxury are encouraged, which end in Diſſoluteneſs of Manners, and laſtly in the Ruin of the State.

Nor is the Diſcouragement of Arms by Laws the only Method of enervating ſuch a State. From an Union calculated for the Inlargement of Commerce and the infeebling of the Conſtitution, the Neglect of Arms ſeemeth to follow of Neceſſity. If Trade and Arms are obſerved to agree, this will not be the Caſe. Commerce, when its Effects are happieſt, poliſhes and refines Mankind; this Conſequence hath been univerſal; Poets and Hiſtorians teſtify it; *Alcinous* a trading Prince of *Corfu* is the moſt elegant Hoſt that is met in the Travels of *Ulyſſes*. Trade alſo introduceth little Arts of Dealing removed too far from Generoſity and manly Dignity. This

alſo

alſo might be illuſtrated; *Punic* Faith was Proverbial, and *Carthage*, a Colony from *Tyre*, from thence derived its Manners and its Trade: The Faith of the *Genoeſe* at preſent is not leſs remarkable; and Cities might be mentioned in the *Britiſh* Dominions which are celebrated for a Species of Ingenuity, not the moſt laudable. Trade alſo makes Men more ſelfiſh by accuſtoming them to make a Profit of every Thing; but Politeneſs, Dexterity of Dealing, and Selfiſhneſs are not the Characteriſticks of a martial People; Simplicity, Roughneſs and Generoſity ſeem more likely to form their Character; but, if Facts ſpeak otherwiſe, this Reaſoning muſt fall to the Ground. The *Tyrians*, a trading People oppoſed with Vigour the Arms of *Alexander*: But ſelf-preſervation was the Inducement, and that will operate when a Love of Martial Glory is extinct. A Tradeſman avoids going forth, till the Neceſſity is immediate, till all is indangered; when the *Tyrians* fought, *Tyre* was beſieged, and all was at Stake; yet they ſunk under the Strength of the

Beſiegers. *Carthage* maintained a Rivalſhip with *Rome*; but her Tradeſmen never compoſed her Armies; they were compounded of Mercenaries whoſe Voices and Habits were unknown to one another. *Marſeilles* oppoſed *Cæſar* with more Spirit than *Tyre* exerted againſt *Alexander*, for it was incouraged by *Pompey*. But was it defended by its Tradeſmen? No, * it gathered within its Walls a ſtrong barbarous Peaſantry which inhabited the Mountains, and when reduced to the laſt Extremity † its Artificers never approached Danger ſo nearly as when they were united with and animated by theſe Mountaineers. During the Period of the greateſt Commerce which *Athens* ſaw, how does *Demoſthenes* complain that no Citizen would Arm, that all was intruſted to Hirelings, without Affection for the City

* Albicos, barbaros homines, qui in eorum fide Antiquitus erant, monteſque ſupra Maſſiliam incolebant, ad ſe vocaverant. Cæſar. Elzevir. 242.

† Neque vero conjuncti Albicis, cominus pugnando deficiebant, neque multum cedebant Virtute noſtris. 271.

City and therefore regardleſs of its Fame? The *Venetians* waged War by Mercenaries, and when *Genoa* ſtepped forth as their Rival, and ſhone with greateſt Glory, no Tradeſmen, but Allies and Mercenaries compoſed her Armies; her Succeſs was due to the great Abilities of a few Captains, and adorned with the Spoils of their Wreaths the State for a Time aſſumed Glory to itſelf. *Rome* had no Traders, *Pruſſia* hath few, and *Switzerland* ſtill fewer. If in States whoſe Conſtitutions breathed Liberty and Glory, Commerce ever fled from Arms, how ſhall they be reconciled to live together in a Nation robbed of its Legiſlature, and dependent on another for its Laws, and even for its Commerce?

NICANDER.

But, *Lyſimachus*, if Trade leſſens the martial Spirit of Traders, it encreaſes the marine Strength, and thereby a new Species of Power is acquired to the State.

LYSIMACHUS.

LYSIMACHUS.

True, *Nicander*, but will that Species of Strength remain undiminiſhed, when all other Parts of the Community are languiſhing? From whence muſt it be recruited? Not intirely from itſelf: After the Revolution of a few Years it will conſiſt of Men taken from the diſſolute infeebled Landmen; or can the Marine be reſtrained from the Exceſſes introduced by Wealth, when all others are indulging in them? Wealth, whether acquired by Conqueſt or Commerce, ſeems in all Ages to have produced ſimilar Effects; Luxury and Corruption have ever filled its Train. Indeed the Vigour of a free Conſtitution hath long held up a Nation againſt the utmoſt Workings of Wealth; and *Britain* owes to her Form of Government, that, in Deſpite of Traffic and its worſt Conſequences, ſhe ſtill maintains her Independence and Dignity. But how ſhall a State without a Parliament or national Councils, without the Vigour of Liberty, counteract the Effects of Commerce?

merce? It ſeems that Trade, by its neceſſary Conſequences, is more effectual in ſuppreſſing a martial Spirit, than a poſitive Law which diſcourages the Uſe of Arms. The latter makes Men fearful only from Ignorance, the former from too great Selfiſhneſs and Enervation. Yet there are Stages of Trade conſiſtent with a martial Spirit, the firſt, in which Induſtry acquires the bare Neceſſaries of Life, for which all Mankind will take Arms; and the middle Stage which brings alſo the Conveniencies of Life, which all Mankind are deſirous to retain: But even in the latter, it would be raſh to hope for more than a Spirit of Defence; a Spirit of Offence and Conqueſt being reſerved for States formed, like the *Roman*, by their Conſtitution for Liberty and Glory: And, when the Spirit of Defence is weakened by exorbitant Luxury, the State is the Property of the firſt bold Invader.

If theſe Reflections deſerve an Application, it might be in this Manner;

*Ireland*,

*Ireland*, a ſubordinate Kingdom, is admitted to a Participation of Trade with *Britain*, a ſuperior State, for the Price of becoming more dependent in its Frame of Government. In the firſt Stage of its Trade and Wealth, while its Vigour is unimpaired, it will ſtrive againſt Reſtraints, and ſeek that Freedom of Conſtitution which gives Property its deareſt Reliſh. If the ſuperior State would maintain the Dependence and Subordinacy, Laws to diſcourage a martial Spirit may be thought neceſſary. If theſe prove ſufficient in the firſt Stage of Commerce; in its farther Progreſs, Trade will co-operate with theſe Laws; and thus an Example may appear of a Nation without Reputation or Glory, ariſing to the higheſt Degree of Corruption that can be ſuppoſed in any State.

NICANDER.

I own, *Lyſimachus*, my Views were confined to the immediate Conſequences of an extended Commerce, a Concourſe of People to this Iſland, the Tillage of thoſe

thoſe extenſive Plains which are now inhabited only by Herds; a Spirit of Induſtry; Health and Strength conſequent of Labour; a free Import of Neceſſaries and Elegancies from all Quarters of the Globe, and an Increaſe of the marine Strength of his Majeſty's Dominions.

LYSIMACHUS.

Permit me, *Nicander*, to theſe happieſt Conſequences, to add others no leſs immediate; as Trade would fly to the moſt commodious Havens which are found in the weſtern and ſouth-weſt Parts of the Iſland; other Ports, and even the weſtern Harbours of *England* would be comparatively neglected. The Capital would neither have Commerce nor a Parliament to induce Inhabitants; and the Courts of Juſtice can hardly be called an Allurement; it would ceaſe therefore to be the Seat of Reſidence of the Nobles and the Gentry. This might be no Misfortune, if they were diſperſed through the Country and adorned their

Villas; but, it is doubtful, whether ſuch would be the Conſequence. Duty would call ſome to *England*, and of thoſe who have the Means of Pleaſure, many daily go in queſt of it. Beſides, a Diminution of their Dignity would breed a Decay of the Nobility; for Title, unattended by Power, becomes contemptible, and a precarious uncertain Power is little better than none. The Removal of the Parliament would cauſe a Decay of Schools and Academies; and the Deſtruction of the Court, a Decay of the more elegant and liberal Arts, which always fly to the Patronage of Genius and Nobility. Theſe are immediate Effects; but, lead the Nation farther, to exorbitant Wealth, and view it covered with Inhabitants, rich indeed, but ſunk in Luxury; without any other internal Government than a King's Privy Council; awed by a military Force; ignorant of Arms by Diſuſe, and abhorrent of them by Effeminacy; ſpoiled of its Nobility and the liberal Arts; without national Councils to counteract

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by prudential Laws the moſt diſſolute Effects of Money; luxurious without Elegance, and avaricious without Juſtice. Then tell me, *Nicander*, is not *Ireland*, with its preſent Conſtitution and limited Commerce, a happier Nation?

After all, if an incorporating Union of Parliaments be thought deſireable; if *Ireland* be doomed to ſhare the Fate of all mercantile States, the diſſolute Weakneſs of Superfluity, without taſting their Liberty; let us ſee in how many Caſes the Nations muſt ſtill remain divided.

1. There muſt be ſeparate Councils of State; for the Privy Council of *Great-Britain* never can inform his Majeſty of the Affairs of *Ireland*, to which they are Strangers.

2. There muſt be ſeveral Officers of the Crown; otherwiſe the Services cannot be performed.

3. A perfect Union of Laws is hardly practicable. Digeſts are difficult, and the Cuſtoms of a Country, ſanctified by Age, and grown more ſacred than Laws, are dear as the Life-blood.

4. To change the Proceſs of Courts, ſhould any Difference be found, would breed Confuſion and Intricacy; but the Difference is held inconſiderable.

5. There muſt be ſeparate Receipts and Finances; ſeparate Impoſts and Cuſtoms; and flouriſhing Commerce will require ſeparate Admiralties.

The Nations remaining neceſſarily divided in theſe Articles; in how many Caſes will *Ireland* be ſubject to Oppreſſion? If there be no Power to awe the Courts of Juſtice, what Juſtice can be expected? If the Trade of *England* is ſo much injured by tedious and expenſive Proceedings; how much would the

Trade

Trade of *Ireland* ſuffer, whoſe Tradeſmen would be ſubject not only to the Expence and Delay, but to the Abuſe of Law? To prevent this, *Nicander*, you will adviſe the Eſtabliſhment of Courts Merchant. The Inſtitution hath been approved by the moſt prudent and honeſt Men of *Great-Britain*, and they are far from being ſingle in the Thought. * In the better Days of *Greece*, *Xenophon* recommended to his Countrymen of *Athens*, a trading City, to give Rewards to thoſe Merchant-Judges who determined Controverſies moſt equally and ſpeedily, thereby giving Diſpatch to Buſineſs, by which more States would trade, and trade more contentedly with them. The Conſequences might be the ſame in *Ireland* from ſuch Inſtitutions, but theſe would affect Trade only: Where would be the Nation's Security againſt Injuſtice

* Εἰ δὲ κὴ τῇ τῦ ἐμπορίυ ἀρχῇ ἄθλα προτιθείη τις, ὁςις δικαίοταλα κὴ τάχιστα διαιροίη τὰ ἀμφίλογα, ὡς μὴ ἀποκωλυὲσθαι, ἀποπλεῖν ὃν βυλόμενον, πολὺ ἂν κὴ διὰ ταῦτα πλείυς τε κὴ ἥδιον ἐμπορεύοιτο.

Ξενοφωνῖ@ Ποροι.

Injuſtice in Articles diſtinct from Commerce?

Before I conclude my Thoughts, let me call to your Remembrance, how often in States joined only by fœderal Treaties, ſuch as the *Achæan*, and the the *Swiſs*, the Virtue and Spirit of one State hath diffuſed an Ardor through the whole. Even the Addreſſes of the *Iriſh* Parliament in the latter Years of Queen *Anne*, may be mentioned among ſuch Occurrences.

I hear it whiſpered by *Nicander*, ſhall *Ireland* by a Commercial Union ſhare equal Advantages, and not bear a Part of the Burthen of *Great-Britain?* No, *Nicander*, every Extent of the Commerce of *Ireland* merits ſome Equivalent, and that Equivalent ſhould eaſe the Load of *Britain*. *Theramenes* then interpoſed; tell me, *Lyſimachus*, is it not Reaſonable that *Ireland*, even in its preſent State, without any additional Advantages of Commerce, ſhould contribute

tribute to the Eaſe of *Great-Britain?* For, if I am rightly informed, in the Courſe of fifty Years, the Value of our Lands is trebled, and yet no Tax in Conſequence thereof hath been impoſed on them.

LYSIMACHUS.

Youth is ever prone to liberal Sentiments; but take not the relative for the intrinſic Value of our Lands. Money, my *Theramenes*, is an eſtabliſhed Sign of the Value of other Things, and in the beſt regulated Governments, Money and Merchandize of every Kind are mutual Repreſentatives of each other. As Coin is but the Means of acquiring the Conveniencies of Life, it ſhould be conſidered how the Acquiſition of other Things is affected by altering the Value of this Subſtitute or Sign. Its Value depends no leſs on its Quantity than its Quality, for among other Cauſes why Money was choſen as a ſign of the Worth of other Things was its Scarcity; therefore its Quantity

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in a great Meaſure determines its Worth; as more is imported, the Value of it is diminiſhed, and the Price of other Things becomes relatively greater; in fewer Words, as Money is more plentiful, Men will have more of it for their Commodities. Therefore, though our Rents may be trebled, yet if the Price of the Neceſſaries of Life which thoſe Rents are to purchaſe, be trebled alſo; can our Lands be called of more Intrinſic Value? That Money during many Years paſt hath grown more abundant in *Great-Britain*, its Public Funds will teſtify, which in Times of Tranquillity were daily reducing the Intereſt, and thereby regulating the Contracts of Individuals and the Value of all Purchaſes. The neceſſary Commerce between theſe Iſlands increaſed the Quantity of Gold and Silver among us, and their Value hath decreaſed proportionably. That Cuſtoms and Taxes eſtabliſhed for the Support of a Government, ſhould be increaſed as the Value of Money decreaſes, Juſtice ſeems to require; otherwiſe the Govern-

Government muſt grow more Poor as Gold and Silver grow more common; but it might prove an ill-deduced Concluſion to affirm, that Things which could not bear a Taxation while Money was ſcarce and highly valued, will admit it when Money is abundant, unleſs it could be proved, that notwithſtanding an Increaſe of the Quantity of our Gold and Silver, the Price of all the Conveniences and Elegances of Life remained unchanged. To affirm alſo, becauſe the Lands of *England* are Taxed, many of which are not more valuable than thoſe which we inhabit, that the Lands of this Iſland therefore ſhould be ſubjected to Taxes, would be reaſoning from a too partial View of Things, without looking to thoſe Equivalents for her Impoſts which *Britain* enjoys, unconfined Traffic, and unexampled Liberty. It would be ſaying little leſs, than, that *Ireland* without the like Freedom either of Conſtitution or Commerce, in ſhort, without equal Strength ſhould ſupport equal Burthens with

*Great-Britain.* If this Reaſoning ever ſhould prevail, who, *Theramenes*, would not chuſe his Acre in that Iſland, where Liberty hath ever ſtrove for Commerce, and Commerce hath been ready to pay the Price of Liberty. But I am falling into ſomething like Concluſions, though I meaned not to deduce any; I have ſubmitted ſuch Facts and Thoughts as occur to me, and had rather have your Reaſoning upon them than my own. Such as they are, they reſpect the Utility and Inutility of an Incorporating Union in General, which is the firſt Object worthy of Attention; when the particular Articles of that Incorporation become the Subjects of ſerious Conſideration, the Union is at Hand.

All were ſo Polite as to expreſs their Pleaſure, and even *Nicander* ſuſpected the Validity of his former Arguments, when the Wife of *Lyſimachus* paſſed the Arbour, and bluſhing, for ſhe feared to interrupt their Converſation, ſought to ſteal away unattended by them; but

*Theramenes*,

*Theramenes*, who admired her Modeſty and Elegance, haſtily croſſed her Walk, and engaging her Attention to a Bed of Ranunculuſes, ſhe was joined by the reſt of the Company, who chearfully mixed in the Amuſements of her Garden.

F I N I S.